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. . . young professionals [need] ... heroes from whom to
model themselves.... Regrettably ... a substantial impact of
law school education is to cut down the attractiveness of
many hero models.
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by Andrew S. Watson
Professor Psychiatry and Professor of Law
The University of Michigan
[Based on the third lecture of Prof. Watson's three-part
Isaac Ray Awards Lectures, "Some Psychological Forces in
the Ebb and Flow of Professional Status: Implications for
Training and Regulation," delivered at Boalt Hall, the
University of California (Berkeley), February 13-15, 1979.]

In this lecture I will take some of the problems and
processes of legal education and law practice which were
E!escribed earlier and explore some suggestions for change.
I have organized my comments in relation to the locale
where the issues arise. although in fact many of them may
occur in several sectors. My friends will recognize some of
the proposals to be reiterative and others will be new.
Hopefully all of them will engage your consideration or
your re-consideration as the case may be.

The Law School Situation
Regarding Professionalism
Student Motivation Issues
In discussing legal education and the processes for
selecting law students, the part which is most difficult to
ascertain, complex to deal with, and most frequently
overlooked in discussions of the subject, are the
motivational and emotional issues that are so important to
the shaping of professional behavior. Since this is the area
of my principal interest and expertise, I will focus my
attention on this aspect of the educational process.

Any training or education program, whether it wishes to
or not, must cope with the motivational factors which
brought the person to the program in the first place. A
medieval knight among other things, took arms to
demonstrate bravery and any mission he undertook would
be bent to demonstrate that fact, whether it was militarily
wise or not. With law students, if their psychological
motivations are not dealt with, they, Hke all frustrated
beings, will have to develop some kind of psychological
armorplate if they are to remain in the field and function. I
mention in my first lecture the special concerns which law
students have about orderliness, aggression, and social
altruism, and how these relate to career selection.
Because professional and ethical issues involving these
emotional motivations are so painful to deal with, it is
crucial that students be confronted with the necessity of
considering them in their learning processes consistently
and persistently. They should infrequently or never
encounter situations in which these matters are ignored.
Students who express unethical views or behaviors should
draw criticism and not be permitted to go forward with the
notion that ethical standards are purely a matter of
personal preference. If the latter course is followed, it
removes one of the primary sources of motivation for
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professionally responsible and ethical behavior; that of
group standard setting and group reinforcement. This is to
say, that the intention to behave ethically is a highly
personal matter, and to note that the standards of ethical
performance always come from the group, and must not be
ignored. A well-integrated and psychologically effective
training institution will challenge deviants and apply great
pressure for them to conform. Such a group should feel a
duty to withhold certification of those who do not.
Law School Curriculum Issues
Here again, I shall limit my observations to matters
relating to professional responsibility and ethical behavior.
In regard to these, each student needs a personal "terrain
map" that accurately reflects his own psychological
territory, that he can recognize fully, and through which he
can move freely with the comfort that comes with
familiarity. Psychological territories like others can only be
clearly marked and labeled after all landmarks have been
thoroughly reconnoitered and recognized. Although
lawyers do this skillfully in relation to substitutive law and
procedure, they are substantially deficient when it comes to
emotional matters. By the time a law student completes his
professional education, he should have a well evolved and
well articulated "moral sense" about law practice. This
should be invested with considerable passion which can
allow him as a working lawyer to press vigorously for
appropriate performance in the difficult circumstances of
his life. Frankfurter once stated, "It is not, I hope,
professional vain glory that makes me regard duly
equipped lawyers as experts in relevance"
(Kurland/Reflections on Ames). It is unlikely that he was
speaking of emotional matters, but in fact psychological
knowledge is so relevant to lawyer work, that I would move
this kind of learning into a place of high curricular
importance and make it a duty for lawyers to possess such
knowledge.
There have been many discussions in the past about
where and how material about professional responsibility
should be introduced. Its relevance has been reluctantly
conceded but now the issue is where can we put it in our
busy schedule? For many reasons, the only fully logical
strategy is what has been called "the pervasive approach ."
Failing to deal with these matters wherever and whenever
they arise, models the image that they are not important. A
special course tacked onto the third year, seems to express
precisely what faculties think of the subject.
Very obviously, not all teachers are well equipped to deal
with matters involving professional responsibility and
ethics. Many have little or no personal experience at the
bar and so may deal with these subjects only abstractly at
best.
Because this kind of proposal nearly always stirs
discomfort and challenge, the question must be, "How do
you deal with a reluctant faculty?" Fortunately, on most law
school faculties there are several usually younger members
who, with a little support from their colleagues and the
dean, would be willing to develop a faculty seminar to
explore the problems of teaching this kind of material. It is
probably desirable to have some external consultant for the
behavioral aspects of this kind of teaching, since their
"magical authority" can help carry the burden of
persuasion during the early phases and before the product
can stand on its own merits. It is an ideal place for an
interdisciplinary team, and I will speak more of this matter
later.
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Issues of Teaching Technique
Most law schools have at least a great teacher or two who
leave indelible traces in their students' memories, and
many lawyers will allude to the inspirational experiences
with them. Among other things, these men seem to have had
native qualities which made students want to emulate them
in their lawyerliness. Sadly however, there are not nearly
enough of these models to generate the personal investment
in professionalism, needed to develop a highly ethical bar.
This means that one of our pedagogic concerns must be to
remedy this deficiency and find new ways to help law
students have some guided experience in coping with the
stresses of professional life. This kind of learning must be
"experiential" if it is to be effective. By this I mean that
students must encounter intellectual concepts like
"professionalism" in a context that will stimulate the
emotional reactions and conflicts that are the real
concomitants of that activity in practice. This learning can
take place in actual practice, or to varying degrees, in
simulated situations. I have long believed that the law
school Socratic classroom is a perfect place to carry out
professional simulations, in fact, simulation may not even
be the correct word since the emotions generated there are
real enough and are closely analogous to those stirred up in
law practice. For example, the relationship between
teacher and student has a precise parallel to the
relationship between a lawyer and his client. In the
classroom, the student seeks help with the mysteries of the
law from his teacher and the way the help is offered
generates feelings of fear, doubt, and awe, as well as a
multitude of other sensations. In the law office, the client
• comes mostly in ignorance to obtain the technical assistance
of the lawyer in solving his problems, and the atmosphere
of the office, whatever its style, raises many compliqited
questions and feelings. If the student can be helped to
understand some of the substantive knowledge needed to
understand and deal with the sense of helplessness and
vulnerability that clients will bring to him later. There are
many other classroom examples of professional tensions
such as, competitive conflicts, concerns over "How do I
look?" "Do I care enough ;:lbout clients?" or "Am I a fool for
caring?"
When a student has difficulty reciting in the Socratic
classroom, most teachers tend to start with the assumption
that he is unprepared and his behavior is a reflection of that
fact. A more likely probability is that they are having some
internal conflict which inhibits their ability to respond. It
might even be a very creative thought, not yet fully formed
which they are fearful to express! Law schools like this one,
have students with very high intellectual capability, and no
answer they come up with should be taken as intellectually
ridiculous even if it seems so at first glance. More often
than not, the responses reflect some highly complex thought
processes, possibly accompanied by some conflicted feeling
or attitude which has momentarily inhibited their
expressiveness. This kind of response difficulty has high
relevance to law practice since only rarely does a client
come in and say explicitly what he wants to say. When
teachers deal with answers as if they are foolish,
intellectually inadequate, or the function of ill preparation,
this models a kind of intellectual arrogance which if carried
over into practice, will certainly do the practitioner little
good and may well contribute to his inadequate
performance there. In other words, there is a great
tendency for law teachers to dismiss classroom
communications too swiftly if they do not come straight
down onto the target. To do that loses an important
opportunity to teach students about the nature of human

communications something of great professional
importance and concern.
Alternatively, one can press the student socratically for
how he is relating his answer to the original question:
"That's interesting Mr. Jones, but I'm not sure how you got
there from my question. Could you tell me more about the
connection you see?" Of course if inflected sarcastically, it
defeats the purpose and is best left undone . However, when
the question is seriously put, the answers illicited are
sometimes quite creative and usually are at least interesting
demonstrations of the way the human communication
process works.
Many teachers will instantly argue that they do not know
how to do this kind of teaching. I would argue that the only
new tools needed to carry out this method are a few
intellectual concepts about how the mind works. Then most
law teachers would have at hand all they need to proceed.
Most law professors have at least as many capabilities for
learning how to teach this way as they do for dealing with
the more conventional law teacher's approach. Both
modalities require practice and learning.
Young Teachers Workshop
Of course being taught how to teach is virtually an
unknown process at the university level. We make the
interesting presumption that a person who has
demonstrated capacity in research and who has himself
excelled academically, will just naturally know how to
teach . Experience in Academe (outside of the law school of
course) suggests quite the contrary. About twelve years ago,
under the leadership of Professor Frank Strong, one-time
dean of the Ohio State Law School, a most unusual project
was initiated. He had long been concerned with teaching
methods and got a substantial grant from the Federal
Department of Education to set up a "Young Law Teachers
Workshop." The first of these workshops was held in
Chapel Hill, North Carolina and the central focus of its
curriculum was to sensitize young teachers to the emotional
factors which operate in the classroom. Although there
were many problems that first year, it went well enough to
be repeated. Plans were immediately instituted for the
second workshop which was held at Madison, Wisconsin.
This was very successful and there have been two more
workshops since then . with about eighty "students" in each.

... both [the psychiatrist and the lawyer] come
very close to being paranoid. It is only as these
fantasies are cleared away that effective
interdisciplinary teaching can take place.

The program of those workshops consisted of plenary
sessions which dealt with a demonstration of Socratic
classroom tensions, demonstrations of a variety of other
teaching methods, discussions of examination techniques,
law school administrative problems, and other subjects
germaine to a new law teacher.
Of central importance to the workshop were the small
group sessions in which 12-15 participants met regularly
and intensively with a leader, chosen for their skill in
dealing with the emotional processes of teaching. In the
context of these groups, each student did a demonstration
class-session which was critiqued by the group and the
leader. These were also video-taped so they could be

studied intensively, by the students alone and/or with
behavior experts. Most of the workshop participants were
enthusiastic about their experience and many wished to
find means for taking this technique back to their home
campus for further exploration. Plans are progressing to
continue this project under the aegis of the Association of
American Law Schools, although the details of its
management are not yet settled.
Another activity which must take place in law schools if
they are to teach professional responsibility with
effectiveness (in my opinion), is the development of
interdisciplinary teams. This should be possible in nearly
any university setting. The first impulse of many when
confronting a need like this, is to figure out some way to get
a financial grant to develop such a program. Although such
a grant is fine, it is not easy to bring off in these days of
limited resources. Fortunately, there are other ways to start
these programs simply using the quid pro quo which flows
from such interlocking teaching efforts. For example, I work
in a child psychiatry hospital, where there is enormous
advantage in involving lawyers in our work. We have many
cases involving decisions about child custody, civil
commitment, juvenile court activities, criminal law matters,
and the now ubiquitous problems of child abuse and child
neglect. These are all intertwined with a multitude of
technical problems, involving privacy, confidentiality, and
privileged communication. Most of us are woefully ignorant
about the legal processes involved in these kinds of cases
and we may easily waste years of our time and the patients',
as we helplessly flop around. We need legal consultation.
On the law school side, the utilization of psychiatric or
psychological input could be extremely fruitful in such
courses as criminal law, family law, negotiation, clinical
law, wills and trusts, some aspects of tort law, evidence and
no doubt others. Those who teach in these areas of law
could all use expert information of the kind that good
psychiatrists and good clinical psychologists can provide. In
the best of all possible worlds, there would be crossdepartmental appointments.
In setting up these interdisciplinary teams, the inevitable
tensions should be dealt with before hand, as members of
both professions learn to work together. Whenever the
psychiatrist is present, fhere is the presumption that he is
busy psychoanalyzing his lawyer colleague and discovering
all of the terrible things hidden within. Similarly for us, we
know that lawyers are going to use their Machiavellian
skills to see to it that we are prevented from carrying out
our professional purposes effectively. By definition, both of
us come very close to being paranoid. It is only as these
fantasies are cleared away that effective interdisciplinary
teaching can take place.
In many law school situations, the tendency is to bring
behavioral scientists in merely to present substitutive
information. This is to make less than the best use of them.
If the person is well chosen whether he be psychiatrist,
psychologist, or social worker, he can offer extremely
valuable commentary upon the educational processes
themselves. In fact, this may be the most valuable way for a
law school to use their skills and it is shortsighted not to do
so.

The Need for Professional Heroes
Now I would like to deal more explicitly with the need
young professionals have for heroes from whom to model
themselves. Let me begin by describing what a hero is. The
original one was the mythological figure hero, a priestess of
Aphrodite who drowned herself after her lover, Leander,
foundered while trying to swim the Hellespont to visit her.
The dictionary states that a hero is "a man of distinguished
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courage or ability, admired for his brave deeds and noble
qualities." Or, "is a man who is regarded as having heroic
qualities and is considered a model or ideal." (We may note
in passing, that the original model for a hero was female,
but that quality has been pre-empted by males in what
seems to be clear sexism! Heroes can be either female or
male.)
Complex and difficult behaviors like "being professional" or "acting ethical" are mostly learned by modeling.
Regrettably, as I have described elsewhere, a substantial
impact of law school education is to cut down the attractiveness of many hero models. For example, when the classroom analysis of a Holmes opinion is opened with a
derisive comment like "This is lovely poetry, but just what
exactly does it mean?", the struggling and anxious neophyte
may easily believe that the teacher thinks the Holmes' arguments are not very good ones. Similarly, if Brandeis is
characterized as being "idealistic," it implies that there is
something wrong with that! Since nearly any student can
readily discern that he would have great difficulty in doing
even as well as either of these stellar figures, he begins to
wonder just what will become of him here in law school.
It seems clear to me that one alteration in legal education
that could be made readily would be for law teachers to be
open and vigorous in their support for concepts of
ethicalness. Even while they rigorously analyze what it
means to be ethical and to turn that into a rational concept,
they should consciously avoid creating even the slightest intimation that they think it a meaningless concept. (As I
remarked in my last lecture, the British in teaching their bar
neophytes, do not hesitate at all to exhort them actively
toward becoming professional.) Thus if a heroic figure like
Holmes is intellectually challenged as to his concepts, his
zeal and concern about law and society must always be
noted and perhaps, even admired by the teacher. In fact,
some teaching materials might well be devoted to the question of where his passion came from. When one reads some
of his letters to his parents while he was an army officer
during the Civil War, his concerns become much more comprehensible. He clearly came out of that experience with
deep inner resolve about the importance of certain values
and one can feel them in his judicial opinions. Regardless of
how one seels Holmes' position, he had the moral courage
to carry out his professional role regularly, even from his
sometimes lonely position as "The Great Dissenter."
Since most contemporary law students avoid the few offerings in "jurisprudence" like the plague, perhaps each
teacher should usher into their own courses the highly visible presence of at least one hero. For example, in Commercial Law the dedication of Karl Llewellyn would do much to
demonstrate what professional integrity looks like there.
Criminal Law could profit from the presence of a Clarence
Darrow or an Edward Bennet Williams. Constitutional Law
could have a vignette of the passionate Holmes while Antitrust could show the background and the modus operandi of
Louis Brandeis. Some understanding of why these men
functioned as they did might help students figure out how
they might develop in similar directions.
To underscore the importance of developing a professional self-image, each student i.n some first year course
would be required to write a paper on their favorite lawyer
hero, describing why they admired that person. No opportunity should be lost to emphasize the importance the
faculty feels about having each student think hard about
what they want to look like in their lawyer future.
This brings me to another unused and omnipresent
resource of law schools: the personality of the professor
himself. Personally, I have never met a more dedicated
group of teachers than are law professors. They are con20

stantly In the vanguard with their concerns about a multitude of social issues, and conversations in the faculty
lounge, vividly demonstrate their dedication to these matters. Regrettably, this rarely gets into the classroom, which
is to lose an enormous modelling potential. I would like to
urge that after the vigor of the Socratic analysis has been
completed in class, that any time an element involving
professionalism is present in the material (like every day!).
that the teacher should reveal his own position on the matter in a way that makes it very clear he cares about it. Then
more students than the Harts in the class would be able to
appreciate Kingsfield's professional passion. rhave often
suggested this to my colleagues and others. After their initial argument that they "don't want to influence the
students" has been dealt with, we get down to their selfconscious concern that students already know all about
them or in fact they aren't even very interesting. And we
talk about student shyness!
"Clinical" Legal Education

In the best of all possible worlds, clinical education
would be closely integrated with other curricular presentation. This of course, is the perfect place to engage the complex tensions generated by professional work. When I first
joined a law faculty in 1955, this kind of opportunity was
very rare indeed. This demonstrated virtues of the Langdellian case method had swept out nearly all "practical" training from the law school setting, and unfortunately, accompanied by an ambiance of "well done ." Hopefully, this attitude will now be rigorously and even objectively reexamined.
I have already commented about what a true dedication
• to clinical education would do to a law school faculty. It
would force the recruitment of some different kinds of
persons with different kinds of skills than those now
favored in faculty choices. It would require the recognition
that there is more to practicing law than merely to have a
powerful intellect. Many law school graduates hold the
belief that law faculties simply do not care about their
needs and concerns for practicing law, and while I do not
think this is totally true, I certainly agree with them that on
the surface it looks as it if is. I have the impression that this
grievance may be at its highest intensity in the great law
schools. I have encountered literally scores of highly competent and very successful graduates of The Harvards in the
land who, twenty years later, still feel almost vitriolic in
their anger about this matter. It is obvious that their selfevaluation is not precisely accurate, because in fact they
clearly demonstrate success: they have either shipped up
their skill out of whole cloth, or else they learned many
things which they either do not know about or do not care to
acknowledge. At least we must see these feelings as symptomatic and a reflection of the fact that they did not feel
prepared to practice law when they graduated.
Of course I can hear all of the law school deans raising
the chorus that, "Yes, if we had an enormous amount of
money available we might then be able to remedy the
situation." It is certainly true that developing good clinical
programs increases the financial burden on a law school.
However, I am not aware that there has been any zealous
request for funds to meet this purpose and it is hard for me
to believe that with the advocacy skills of law professors
have , they could not carry this argument with at least some
success if they wished to do so. Neither can I fail to note that
good law schools have a plethora of small seminars which
explore a multitude of esoteric subjects which have at least
as an important function, the satisfaction of some
intellectual curiositv of the teacher. I know full well that
this is the birthing place of many new and important ideas

for the law teacher and the law. But in terms of value to
students, it is highly unlikely that they can hold a candle to
the importance of developing professional skills and the
appropriate professional images that will be needed by the
vast majority of graduates.

... we can no longer greatly doubt that our
elegant teaching procedure causes marked
student distress. We should use every means
possible to correct this source of personal
difficulty and professional incapacitation.

I also believe that vigorous institutional financial support
for clinical law programs would inevitably generate the
kind of powerful intellectual investment in exploring
practice problems and practice issues, which characterized
the pre-judicial work of Brandeis. I have never heard
anyone demean his pragmatic explorations and without
doubt, many of the issues of practice, if examined with the
intellectual zeal that law professors can mobilize , would
produce similar results in clinical work. When wedded with
interdisciplinary knowledge from sociology, psychology,
psychiatry, economics, and no doubt many other collateral
fields, there would be a gold mine of material that could
simultaneously help law students better understand and
develop their self images as working professionals.
One of the most important aspects of incorporating this
kind of material into effective utilization by legal educators, '
relates to the status of the clinical faculty. In many law
schools they are assigned the status of second-class citizen
and are not even on the tenure track. In fact they are hardly
known by their colleagues on the "regular" faculty, and
they do not have any of the kinds of security needed to
plunge freely into the hectic chores of teaching law students
how to be lawyers. It takes a very stalwart individual to
persist under these circumstances, and I have seen superb
clinical teachers slip away from academic settings because
of these deep personal frustrations .
Now that much of the seed money which came from
CLEPR is beginning to disappear, we will swiftly see what
kind of dedication law schools have to this deep student
concern . I hope that this struggling new sector of the law
school curriculum will not die of malnutrition and then
have to reincarnated later. If that were to happen, of
course, it would be nothing new on the historical scene. It is
a pity however, that once in awhile we can not learn from
the past and avoid such waste.
On Ameliorating the Impact of Law School
and Lawyer Professionalism

First of all let me reiterate that I am under no illusion
about the enormous contribution that contemporary legal
education makes to lawyers' skills. Much of this is a product
of the intellectual honing effected by the Socratic method.
But I suspect that few would argue that there are not some
glaring and serious deficiencies in an enormous number of
practicing members of the bar. It seems to me that
Frankfurter captured one of these deficiencies in noting in
the way lawyers advise their clients about, "a wise course
of action ." When they follow only the law, their advice is
inadequate , "because legal right and legal wrong, after all ,
on the whole, are the minima of morality, and minima of
social duties , and not the maxima of wisdom ." Because we

wish law students first of all to care strongly about helping
their clients wisely, we must do something about the
apparent loss of access to their motivation for social
altruism from which they suffer. I believe it is possible to
perform a kind of psychological innoculation on students at
the beginning of their law school experience so that they do
not feel quite so much need for developing a defensive
armor of callousness. If they can be helped to recognize that
the powerful feelings they experience are not strange,
aberrant, nor even signals of forthcoming doom, they can
probably resist some of the common-place changes which
seem to happen in law school. This kind of processintervention can either be in lieu of, or in addition to, the
pervasive approach. It relates simply to the concept that
prevention is more effective and less costly than remedy.
Also it could help students avoid a great deal of the human
discomfort and misery which befalls so many of them now.
It would seem to me that we can no longer greatly doubt
that our elegant teaching procedure causes marked student
distress. We should use every means possible to correct this
source of personal difficulty and professional
incapacitation.

The Professional Roles of Lawyer:
Some Types of Tensions
The word role, which comes from sociology, defines the
things a person does which are imposed upon him from
without. For example, a physician may carry out a
treatment process on a patient because the patient permits
as well as expects it. Such role activities of course, may be
reinforced by law as well as expectation. Some of them will
be by implicit expectation such as the lawyer as counselore.
Whether or not a lawyer wished to become concerned with
the personal problems his client believes are related to law,
they will be imposed upon him because the client expects it
and Counsel will have to deal with that anticipation one
way or another.
In this section I will take a few of the many role
expectations which imninge upon lawyers at the present
time, and look at some of the ways in which they may
produce performance conflict. In all of them, if counsel is to
function effectively, he must "know himself." This selfknowledge is a crucial part of the diagnostic process of
understanding and knowing what clients are doing and
wanting as they relate to counsel.
The Tension Between Being an Ethical Member of the Bar
Vs. Functioning as The Zealous Advocate af a Client

Whatever lawyers do within the legal system, they must
be viewed as "trustworthy" if the system is to work. Much
of the effecti veness of a legal system, and much of society's
willingness to accept the legal system, depends on whether
or not they can perceive a true rule of law, administered
and implemented by lawyers who can be trusted to adhere
to the system. This concept is of course contained in canon I
of the code of professional responsibility. Although lawyers
will zealously press their clients' interests (canon 7). they
must do so within the limitations imposed by law and
ethical practices.
This may generate problems between client and counsel.
Clients will start off with the anticipation that their lawyer
will do the things they want to have done on their behalf
and they do not readily comprehend why certain wishes are
refused . In British litigation, there is a buffer between the
advocate-barrister and the office-work solicitor which
21

functions to protect barristers from pressures by clients, as
well as to provide the client with an interpreter for the
system.
When a lawyer appears to be or is too zealous on behalf
of his client, he raises questions in the minds of many
members of society in regard to the trustworthiness of the
system. The recently published article in Esquire about Roy
Cohn demonstrates this point dramatically: Cohn makes no
bones about the fact that he's going to do anything he can to
win the case for his client [whatever that means) .
Lieberman suggests that a lawyer like Cohn is only doing
what he has been taught to do by the system. He also
suggests that the way this difficult matter should be handled
is to have counsel articulate vigorously to his client, all of
the pros and cons of a particular course of action including
the conflicts between their wishes, the law, and the canons
of ethics. Then he should urge his client to behave lawfully!
He views this as a means for counsel to deal with these two
contradictory principles.
Another serious problem for a lawyer arises when he
encounters an opponent who, by disregarding the canons,
gains an advantage. What should he do? Should he behave
the same way in order to even the balance? Do you report
the other lawyer's behavior to the bar grievance committee
and seek redress that way? What does this do for your
client? These are terribly difficult questions but to beg them
is to ignore the realities of professional responsibility and
ethical behavior. No wonder a lawyer's life is difficult.
Hired Gun Vs . Wise Advisor
One of the easiest ways a lawyer "escapes" some of the
difficult and painful decisions he makes about what to do
for his client, is simply to state that he is a hired gun who
does what his client asks. This would be easier to accept as
an explanation if one saw its uniform practice in all areas of
legal work, but obviously this is not the case. Often in
business law practice, if counsel sees his client embarking
on an unwise course of action, he will vigorously try to
dissuade him . In family and criminal law areas, however,
counsel seems more willing to posture himself as hired gun.
I interpret this to reflect the intrinsic difficulties of family
law practice that relate to its highly emotional ambiance. It
is a taxing area of practice especially if one has no technical
tools with which to cope. No wonder a lawyer would be
drawn to the solution of doing "what my client wants me to
do." Unfortunately, this strategy fosters unwise behavior of
precisely the kind Justice Frankfurter talks about. He says,
"Again and again during my twenty-one years or so on the
court, I have been appalled at the lack of wisdom of lawyers
giving advice, on which they might get vindication in the
highest courts in the land, but the upshot of which would be,
and often is, great damage to their clients." If a lawyer is to
be a wise advisor and avoid being merely a hired gun, it is
necessary for him to develop emotional and intellectual
freedom in order that he can perceive wise choices. This
relates back to some of my earlier comments about how
lawyers need to be educated.
Independent Counsel Vs . Those Permanently Retained
("Kept")
I noted earlier that a lawyer's work carries a built-in
conflict of interest stemming from the fact that the help he
gives his client is also the source of his livelihood. The
simple fact that lawyer income may bear some relationship
not only to "billable hours" but also to "pleasing the client,"
may greatly influence the decisions lawyers make in the
office as well as in private life. (Abel-Stevens) Even when
counsel works at poverty law (a decision surely motivated
22

by powerful emotional as well as intellectual concerns),
there is a temptation to use the case to gain personal goals
[like making new law with a class action) rather than
merely to solve the client's problem in the easiest way
possible. This conflict of interest cannot be eliminated but it
requires a lawyer to invest a great deal of conscious
concern in order to minimize this ubiquitous risk.
Louis Brandeis planned a deliberate life strategy to
enable himself to keep as free as possible from the kind of
attachments that would limit his decision making, and be
sure that his identification with a particular legal position
did not become fixed . He provides us with the interesting
demonstration that he could serve brilliantly on the union
side in one case, and then in the next, argue for a
corporation. Because of this freedom, he was
extraordinarily important in the early shaping of labor law,
and several other legal areas vital to our national interests.
Justice Jackson's father apparently pressed this same point
home to his son. It is described as follows: "It was a man's
spirit or independence that was important. To make his
point clear, he often put it this way to his growing boy:
'Keep always in the position where you have a right to , and
can tell any man to go to hell.' "
It is this sense of independence which is so vital to the
decisional freedom of professionals. Without it they cannot
possibly fulfill their role which is so difficult even under
the best of circumstances.
Adequacy of Counsel (Specialization) Vs. Lawyer
Incompetence/ Malpractice ("I can do anything")

Recently the legal profession has been experiencing a
great deal of pressure to become specialized. One source of
.. this has been the ongoing commentary by Chief Justice
Burger and others about the adequacy of trial counsel. They
have urged that trial advocacy become a specialty, and that
there should be sufficient training for certification to insure
adequate representation of clients in the courtroom. While
it can be argued easily that the same end could be met
without formalized specialization, such a position requires
that every lawyer have at least enough self-awareness that
he would refer his clients to other counsel when their needs
exceeded his own professiqnal capacities. Such
emotionally-laden questions as, "What do I need help
with?"; "Does asking for help blight my self-esteem?" and
many other such emotionally-laden questions inevitably
arise. It seems to me that present methods of legal
education do not develop this skill and in fact may even
blunt it.
Any competence standards for lawyers must surely
include the development of interpersonal skills. If a lawyer
does not know how to conduct a skillful interview, there is
certainly no way that he can routinely elicit from his clients
the information he needs to carry out his legal tasks. It is not
even possible any longer for the bar to argue that this is a
skill which can not be measured. As an example, Professor
Louis Brown at the University of Southern California has
developed several quite objective ways to ascertain a
lawyer's interviewing skill, which could be used easily in
any kind of specialty examination.
The three examples I have described of conflict and
tension relating to a lawyer's work, are but a sampling of
the kinds of things that must be mastered if one is to be an
effective and responsible professional. Most lawyers have
no trouble at all in seeing these problems in others . This
suggests to me that they have the perceptual capacity to
learn to recognize them in themselves if they would wish to
do so. To make this kind of self-awareness a goal of
professional training does stir up all sorts of personal and
group discomfort, and such learning will not come easily. If

we try, however, we may not only improve the level of
professionalism, we may also slowly develop the means to
greatly increase the personal satisfactions of being a
lawyer.

Postgraduate Education of The Bar
in Relation to Professional Behavior
Conscientious professionals have always engaged in a
kind of continuing education process. Their work stimulates
it, their sense of concern requires it, and in a multitude of
formal and informal ways, their professional associations
foster it. However, in recent years there has been a large
development of more formalized continuing education
programs. Many states have Institutes to carry it out,
usually formed by a consortium of law schools and bar
organizations, and they offer a multitude of different
offerings. When planning such programs, there are many
complicated matters to take into consideration.
Issues of Timing
We can assume that lawyers who have just graduated
from law school are so close to their training that they do
not need refresher courses on substantive law. On the other
hand, they feel desperately ignorant about law practice and
are highly motivated to learn about its myriad problems.
They evaluate postgraduate courses strictly according to
whether or not they will have practice utility and if they do,
registration will be high. Also, at the beginning of practice,
although young lawyers will be eagerly seeking work, in
fact they will have more free time available than at any
subsequent time. They may also be quite open-minded
about how to practice law, and this i::an facilitate learning. ...
One of the crucial challenges to program planners is how to
engage the interest of young practitioners in issues about
professionalism. What will make a young lawyer want to
learn how to "argue" with clients to behave lawfully, as
Lieberman suggests they should, even as they desperately
seek to obtain such clients? How can a young lawyer make
visible professional integrity into a saleable service skill?
Can the consumer of legal services be taught to value the
evidences of professional integrity?
One of the things I believe young lawyers must be taught
is that their self-survival concerns must also embrace the
development of what Sir William Osler, one of the great
medical teachers of the last century, called Aequinimitas.
(Osler was one of the founders of the modern form of
clinical teaching in medicine at Johns Hopkins University in
1888.) In other words, in addition to serving the client and
his interests, it is vital that a lawyer realize that he must
also satisfy himself about the way he conducts his work.
Even if unprofessional behavior escapes notice by peers,
there is no fooling one's inner self. I should modify this by
saying that there is no fooling of self without invoking
drastic interpsychic processes which cause serious
disequilibrium, such as alcoholism or a multitude of other
psychological difficulties. These personal disabilities are as
much a part of practice economics as failure to get clients in
the first place. These are tough problems and a real
challenge to postgraduate educators.
The Third Year of Law School
If professional education were to be organized along
completely logical lines, it might well constitute grounds for
altering the third year law school following such
suggestions as those of Deans Carrington and Cram ton. In
their suggested curricula, the third year of law school would

be heavily involved with professional skills training and
would utilize a kind of teacher who is capable of bringing
these matters before the young student in solid, "practical"
forms. One of the things which academic teachers often
critize about the educational efforts of practitioners is their
proclivity for telling war stories. However, if these
practitioners were to join forces with traditional law
teachers (i.e., team teach), together they could evolve
materials and techniques which would readily embrace the
skills of both. Needless to say, this would require some
substantial psychological harmonizing for them to move
toward mutual respect. We are all familiar with the
aggressively derisive remarks that go back and forth
between the academic and the practice sides of the bar.
Matters For the Organized Bar
In the years since Watergate, there has been much
discussion about the question of what, if anything, can be
done by the bar to foster improved professionalism and
ethical behavior. Some clearly feel that in the first place
there is little that needs remedy, or second, there will
always be scalawags among us so there is no changing that.
However, there are some things that could be done that
might bring improvement.
Size of Bar Organizations
Justice Brandeis made a great issue of the fact that when
an organization becomes so large that its head can no longer
personally encompass its activities, it begins to function in
ways which are self-defeating. Presumably, the same thing
might be said about the bar. You recall , that one of the
factors which seems to make the British bar function so well
is its small size. In that bar, it is possible to know a large
percentage of one's colleagues. One sees them in the dining
room, at the Inns of Court, and in the highly centralized
courtrooms. This is made possible partially through the
division of the bar into the solicitor and barrister branches.
Lawyers who practice in small communities enjoy similar
advantages. They know each other well, seem to care about
what their colleagues think about them, and can hide very
little about the way they practice. This substantially
reinforces their ethical attitudes about lawyering and
fosters the solidification of group standards. When we look
at the huge bars in our major metropolitan centers, all of
these intrinsic advantages of smallness disappear. Could
anything be done about this? Might it be possible to
subdivide the large metropolitan bars into relatively small
groups so that more collegial relationships could evolve?
What might motivate such smaller bars to develop a group
identity? Perhaps such a bar could take on the task of
providing some apprenticeship experience to law students.
Could they find ways to have a student trail them about
during vacation time? Could they gain some personal pride
and satisfaction over knowing that they were helping young
law students learn about the ways of a professional? Could
such a process be the vehicle for renewed exploration by
students, lawyers, and law faculty of some of the very
difficult problems of being a professional? These kinds of
experiments might be carried out by bar groups that were
small enough so they could be involved as committees of the
whole to deal with this kind of project.
I have described earlier the social power of the dynamics
of "shaming." Is there any way this force could be utilized
effectively by a bar? Could this be linked in some way to
economic advantage? Conversely, when an individual
functions in a way that is professionally desirable, is there
some way it could lead to social or economic advantage?
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What Can the ABA Do to Promote Professionalism?
For some time the American Bar Foundation has carried
out a substantial amount of excellent research on behalf of
the ABA. Perhaps they might devote some of their interest
and economic resources to studying the forces related to
professionalism, such as the effects of various kinds of law
firm organization on professional behavior. For example,
how do large firms manage their extensive orientation
programs with their young firm associates and what are
their effects? Do they make the right value choices so far as
the bar is concerned? Is there anything in those training
programs that could be organized in relation to the solo
practitioners of the bar? Perhaps some of this information
would be seen to relate to "trade secrets," but if that should
be the case, it would tell us something about the relative
values of profesional behavior versus lawyer advantage.

Would it be possible for the ABA to help put
together "road shows" made up of some of the
great lawyers of the day to speak to law students
and young lawyers?

I have emphasized the importance of models in shaping
behavior. Would it be possible for the ABA to help put
together "road shows" made up of some of the great
lawyers of the day to speak to law students and young
lawyers? The late Mr. Justice Clark in the latter years of his
life, spent a great deal of time visiting different law schools
and bar groups, talking about matters of law practice.
Presumably one might argue about what it was he was
modeling, but having heard him do this several times , it
seemed to me that at least he showed law students and
young lawyers something of the excitement he felt in being
a good lawyer and being dedicated to issues of public
importance. There have also been a few lawyers recently
like Archibald Cox, who stood conspicuously against
authority as a matter of principle. Of course it is easy to
imagine all of the fears about politicizing this kind of
activity; who will choose the representative for what value?
One can readily concede such a risk, but in my opinion, it is
not nearly so serious a danger as that of failing to present
any models of the values and behaviors that we seek to
foster .
Another project which the ABA is in an ideal position to
carry out is to see that good video tapes of the great lawyers
and judges of the day are archived. Would it not be
wonderful is we had som~ well conducted interviews with
Justices Holmes, Cardozo, Brandeis, and Frankfurter?
Would it not be exciting for law students to listen and watch
the judicial thought processes of the brothers Hand, or
better still, to see them at work? If we cannot decide now
who is great because of our fears of political implications,
we could easily overcollect for these archives , letting our
successors make the historical choices. At least we should
be sure that we capture this kind of information for
subsequent generations of law students and lawyers.
The Effects of Judicial Behavior
Perhaps one of the more powerful pressures that can be
brought to bear against the professional behavior of
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lawyers lies in the hands of the judiciary. At least they are
in a position to deal vigorously with the public professional
behavior of lawyers as it relates to the trial process. It is my
impression that American trial judges are rather loathe to
control aggressively the unethical behavior of counsel
before them. For example, when trial counsel asks
questions which have the instrumental function of bringing
inadmissable information before the jury, while they will
be objected to and the jury will be told to ignore the
question, everyone knows that they will have succeeded in
their intentionally unethical and unlawful communication.
Although admonitions are proforma, disciplinary action
seems to be extremely rare .
The judges' role is a very difficult one, filled with many of
the same kind of emotional conflicts which lie at the heart
of effective professional behavior both on and off the
bench. The British judiciary, seem to be much more active
and effective in dealing with the courtroom behavior of
counsel. There is little question that if counsel oversteps the
bounds of ethical propriety, they are stopped cold, and they
will suffer some penalty for having done so. This
probability is so clear that counsel themselves seem to have
thoroughly adopted the attitude of constraint and propriety,
and this is as it should be.
Because of the central importance of judges, they are an
important group upon whom to focus training of
professionalism. There is no question that they could be
given a kind of training to enable them to perform this
function more effectively and with more personal comfort,
but neither is there any doubt that such a presentation
would be initially unpopular. Only as they came to grasp its
ultimate utility would the purpose and value of such
experience become apparent. Some few judicial training
' programs have made tentative steps in this direction.

Issues About the Canons of Ethics
For any canon of ethics or code or professional behavior
to work, practitioners must first of all accept the standards
and then they must adopt the full intention to try to
implement them. Therefore, the teaching/training
approach to professionalism must focus heavily upon how
to instill and reinforce such an ethical intention. Although
there will be some breaches which are the product of total
ignorance, hopefully these will be rare. The vast majority
will come from either deliberate, conscious decisions to
breach or more commonly, in my opinion, actions in which
the lawyer has succumbed to internal psychological
. conflicts about which he is not fully cognizant. This suggests
then that for a lawyer to perform ethically he must be
willing to engage in some very intensive self-scrutiny in
order to gain a substantial knowledge about his own
motivational patterns as they relate to professional
behavior and the code of ethics.
With this process in mind, the form and content of the
"preamble" to a code of professional behavior which is
admonitory and aspirational becomes very important. Its
purpose is hopefully to potentiate lawyers' awareness and
willingness to deal with these complex and conflictual
issues. It is not remiss or inappropriate to note there, that
the practitioner's own satisfaction with his work might
have a close relationship to his wish or even his "need" to
be ethical. This obviously turns on the assumption that
there will be strong group reinforcement of the standards
which in turn will foster the psychological desire to be a

part of the group. The preamble might also describe and
concede the painful dilemmas and temptations which exist
for counsel, that lead him to behave in a self-serving way.
This acknowledges where the psychological pressure will
be coming from and it alerts him to the fact that to behave
ethically requires constant attention.
I have already commented on the central importance of
lawyers being willing to report the ethical breach of
another, and the current inclination to nullify this
requirement.
Because the actual implementation of a code of
professional responsibility is so fraught with pain and
trepidation, it would seem to me that a bar might develop a
kind of stepped procedure which it could teach to its
members about how to handle breaches. A first step might
be that the observing lawyer would communicate directly
and solely to the one who seemed to offend the code. If this
communication were effective, the "offender" would
evidence that fact by making some kind of response of
acknowledgement and be appreciative of the fact that he
had received a private warning (although no doubt he
would have and should have some inner turmoil) .
The second stage of intervention might be additionally to
report the observed behavior to a member of the lawyer's
firm if the first step was thought to have been ineffective. A
letter to the senior partner or associate would no doubt
mobilize a certain amount of anxiety in the firm about its
public image and probably bring internal pressure against
the individual who committed the questionable act. It
would put them all on notice that this behavior will have to
be stopped or obviously there might be some future
difficulty.
Finally, if there is no alteration of behavior and another
similar occurrence is seen, then the observer would report
the matter to the bar's grievance committee. They already
appear to have a stepped intervention process. I would
merely repeat what I described earlier, that it is important
in process terms, to make sure that the person who reported
the grievance knows that his report was fairly evaluated
and something of why the matter was dismissed. Otherwise,
there would be strong inclinations to avoid making these
psychologically discomforting moves in the future.
The final thing I would like to say about the code is that it
seems mostly to stay on the book shelf. A very large
challenge"to the bar is to find ways to raise each lawyer's
concern about its implementation. I suspect that a few bar
meetings with titles like, "Lawyers' Unethical Behavior:
Should We Be Licensed By the State?" would not only draw
a crowd, but would stimulate a lively and useful discussion.
Much attention to self help is needed here.
In these lectures I have attempted to describe some of the
social and psychological factors that appear to impinge
presently upon the effective functioning of professionals .
Although many of them were invoked to improve and
protect society, some of their effect has been to gnaw away
at the very core of the professional identity, without which
no physician nor lawyer can effectively fulfill his difficult
functions. I hope I have persuaded you to the belief that it is
only a well trained, deeply conscientious professional
concern which can ultimately protect people from the risks
attendant upon receiving help from a doctor or a lawyer.
That kind of ethical concern can only be developed by a
very special kind of educational experience joined to
continuing professional group reinforcement. I have also
tried to set forth some of the problems I see in
contemporary professional education as well as to lay out
some suggestions for re-tuning this training so that it may
better fulfill its purposes.

Because most of these questions involve ethical issues
and because we lack the luxury of having much hard,
scientific data on the subject, I suspect I have sounded
somewhat like a preacher with all of my shoulds and
shouldn'ts. If that be true, I can then only say something like
Pax Vobiscum.

Andrew S. Watson
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